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†

Gordon C. Rausser, Susan Stratton Sayre, and Leo K. Simon

Abstract
This paper assesses the political implications of intra-aquifer heterogeneity in the
benets and costs of optimal groundwater management. We use simulation modeling
to predict groundwater extraction regimes under two alternative local decision-making
structures and compare these structures to optimal management. Local collective action
performs poorly when the intra-aquifer disparity in the potential gains is large. Moreover, large intra-aquifer disparity is generally associated with large potential gains. As a
result, local collective action is unlikely to be successful in capturing the largest welfare
gains. Individual subregions within a groundwater basin almost always benet most
from political structures whose outcomes diverge from optimal management. These results may be of particular interest to policymakers in California. The state of California
currently allows local regions to make their own decisions about groundwater management with little outside intervention. The analysis in this paper suggests that there
may be regions where large potential gains from optimal management are available,
but cannot be realized by the two alternative local political institutions. This suggests
that there may be a role for State intervention in the local political processes by which
local water management decisions are made.
Keywords: collective action, Nash bargaining, groundwater
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Introduction

Groundwater is an important source of water for much of the world. It is estimated that of
the world's fresh water, almost 75% is locked in the polar ice caps and 25% is groundwater.
In other words, surface water makes up less than 1% of the world's fresh water supply
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(Alley et al., 1999). As pressure on water supplies has increased around the world, so has
groundwater pumping. In many areas, groundwater is being pumped at a much faster rate
than it can be replenished, causing groundwater levels to fall. These drops

per se

do not

indicate an economic problem; because of discounting of future costs and benets, it can
be rational for users to prefer using water today despite increased pumping costs or lower
supplies in the future. However, since groundwater aquifers are common-property resources,
in the absence of a carefully managed and enforced system of private property rights to
the groundwater stock, water users have an incentive to pump more water than is socially
optimal, causing water levels to decline too rapidly.
Economic simulations have shown the aggregate welfare losses of this overpumping to
be quite small in many circumstances. This fact was rst observed by Gisser and Sanchez
(1980a,b), and has been conrmed by many later studies (e.g. Kim et al., 1989; Rubio
and Casino, 2001, 2003; Knapp et al., 2003). While these studies model groundwater model
aquifers as homogeneous, groundwater levels can in fact vary substantially within an aquifer.
Brozovic et al. (2003, 2010) demonstrate that such intra-aquifer variations can lead to a
substantial increase in the size of the common property externality.
This paper investigates the political implications of intra-aquifer variations. In many
regions, including the state of California, authority to regulate groundwater lies with local
entities whose boundaries do not match those of groundwater aquifers. As a result, multiple
local authorities are involved in decisions about whether and how to regulate groundwater withdrawals within a given aquifer. A critical question is whether local collective action
among these entities can implement eective management regimes or whether regimes should
be imposed from above by a central regulator (e.g. a state or national government).1 Elinor
Ostrom evaluates the local institutions that have been involved in such decisions, specically
for groundwater management systems in Southern California (1990). She contrasts the success of collective action to manage groundwater in the Raymond, Central, and West Basins
1 In

this case of aquifers whose boundaries cross national borders, there is no such central regulator
available.
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with the failure of local collective action in San Bernardino county. She oers several conditions that increase the likelihood of successful collective action. These include a common
expectation of harm from failing to act, similar impacts of proposed changes, low discount
rates, low information, transformation, and monitoring costs, pre-existing trust among the
players, and a small group of players. Of particular interest to us is her focus on homogeneity; she emphasizes that eective management is far more likely to emerge when all players
are aected similarly by implementable management decisions.
In addition to Ostrom's Southern California study, there are several others that have
investigated the political dimension of groundwater management. Hellegers and van Ierland
(2003) argue that groundwater management alternatives should be assessed for both their
economic eciency and their political feasibility. They specify several normative criteria for
policy instruments including: their equity, ease of implementation, their political acceptability and their capacity to achieve environmental and economic objectives. They conclude
that traditional economic instruments (taxes and subsidies) score poorly because they are
hard to implement, impose unequal impacts, and/or are politically unacceptable. Blomquist
(1992) outlines the management regimes developed in various areas of Southern California
and argues that allowing local agencies to develop groundwater management regimes on their
own may be preferable to imposing management from above by a central regulator because
local autonomy allows for a high degree of individualization and creativity in confronting
problems.
White and Kromm (1995) review groundwater management districts in Colorado and
Kansas. Most groundwater in these regions is used for irrigation. In both states, management
districts have authority to restrict the drilling and location of wells, to institute pumping
limits, and to assess taxes to pay for management expenses. Stephenson (1996) examines the
development of groundwater management in Nebraska's Upper Republican Natural Resource
District (URNRD). The URNRD adopted well-spacing requirements and imposed 5-year
pumping limits. Stephenson identies situational and policy factors that aect the potential
3
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for self-regulation. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of substitute water sources,
existing knowledge base, belief systems, dynamics of conict, boundary rules, decision rules,
regulatory rules, nancing, and monitoring/enforcement.
As noted above, spatial variation in water levels within aquifers leads to intra-aquifer
heterogeneity with respect to the gains and losses from centralized management relative
to unregulated common property. Thus, real-world hydrological conditions tend to create
exactly the situation Ostrom identies as problematic for local collective action.
In this paper, we construct a political economy model of local action and use it to assess
the political implications of intra-aquifer heterogeneity in benets and costs. In particular, we
evaluate how various political institutions perform compared to optimal management. Since
there are many possible local institutions that could be involved in groundwater management,
we also discuss the choice of alternate institutions, from the perspective of both aggregate
welfare as well as from the perspectives of individual subregions within a groundwater basin.
Because there are no closed form solutions to the political economy models used in
this paper, we employ Monte Carlo simulation and response surface analysis to investigate
the impacts. The Monte Carlo analysis allows us to evaluate the impacts for a broad set
of possible aquifer conditions. The response surface analysis provides a concise way to
summarize how these varying conditions inuence political outcomes. Although our model
is not explicitly tied to any specic region, the parameters of interest and their distributions
were chosen to be representative of California's Central Valley. California has no statewide
groundwater management institutions so the local political action models developed in this
paper are indicative of groundwater management institutions within the state.
In Section 2, we present a model of groundwater use in several subregions within a
given aquifer, coupled with models of various political structures for determining subregional
groundwater use levels. In Section 3, we explain our Monte Carlo simulation methodology.
Section 4 presents the results of these simulations and uses response surface analysis to
obtain insights about the patterns driving dierences in performance across the simulation
4
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we examine.

2

The Model

Groundwater extraction and management decisions are dynamic; decisions about how much
to extract today are made in part on the basis of expected future benets and costs. In
this paper, however, our primary interest is in the political interaction between subregions
of a given groundwater basin, rather than the dynamic path of groundwater extractions.
To focus the intra-aquifer interaction, we construct a static model calibrated to match the
results of a dynamic model that was developed in Stratton (2008).
This dynamic model tracks water levels in several subregions of an aquifer on an annual
basis. Year to year changes are caused by extractions within subregions and the partial
equalization of water level variation between subregions. Fundamentally, the results of a dynamic hydrological model are driven by two major factors: the demand for groundwater and
the impact of each subregion's pumping on its own and its neighbors' costs. Our static model
is thus based on these two components. The demand parameters are driven by a region's
overall demand for water, the amount of surface water it has available, and the eciency of
its surface water delivery system. The cost parameters and regional interaction parameters
are driven by the depth to groundwater, the distance between cells and the hydrological characteristics of the aquifer. In our static model, the cost of water is proportional to a weighted
sum of groundwater use in each subregion where the weight is inversely proportional to the
distance between subregions. Thus, the eect of water use by adjacent districts increases as
the distance between the districts shrinks.
Formally, in our static model, the aquifer contains several subregions, indexed by n. Each
subregion has a present value water benet function of the form

1
Bn (xn ) = αn xn − βn x2n
2

5

(1)
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and a present value cost function of the form

Cn (x) = φn xn

X

γnm xm

(2)

m

where x = (xn ) is a vector of subregional (constant) annual groundwater extractions, γnm
is a coecient whose value decreases as the distance between subregion n and subregion m
increases. The parameters αn and βn are the intercept and slope, respectively, of a subregion's
demand for groundwater and φn measures the impact of a subregion's pumping on its own
costs. We refer to φn as the cost coecient. In our simulations, all of these parameters are
calibrated based on the results of derived from the dynamic model developed in Stratton
(2008). The calibration process is described in Section 3.
A subregion's utility function is represented by net benets:

un (x) = Bn (xn ) − Cn (x) .
For notational simplicity in discussing the results, we dene the aggregate benet function
as

U (x) =

X

un (x) .

n

Under unrestricted common property, each subregion will maximize its own net benets,
taking the actions of the other subregions as given. The common property solution is the
vector x̂ dened by

αn − βn x̂n − φn

X

γnm x̂m − φn γnn xn = 0

(3)

m

for all n.2 By contrast, the manager seeking to maximize aggregate benets would set
extractions equal to x∗ where

αn − βn x∗n − φn

X

γnm x∗m −

m
2 This

X

φm γmn x∗m = 0

(4)

m

format assumes an interior solution where all subregions extract positive amounts of groundwater.

6
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for all n.

The dierence between the two solutions is the common property external-

ity(Rausser and Zusman, 1992). In the common property solution, subregions care only
about the impact of their pumping on their own costs, while optimal management takes
account of all impacts of pumping.
In reality, it is very unlikely that the optimal management solution will be implemented.
Instead, the management regime must emerge from some political process. The political
structures within which groundwater policy is formulated vary across aquifers. In what
follows, we focus on two models of these processes: Nash bargaining between subregions and
maximizing weighted average subregional utility.
Local Nash Bargaining.

One conceptualization of groundwater management policy for-

mation is as a local bargaining process among subregions of the aquifer. We model this
process using the bargaining model introduced in Nash (1950). The Nash bargaining solution is given by

xN = arg max
x

J
Y

[uj (x) − uj (x0 )] .

(5)

j=1

where x0 denotes the default outcome, and J denotes the number of players. In this setting,
the elements of the vector x are groundwater extractions in each subregion. The default
vector x0 is the outcome under the status quo. In the present case, the status quo would be
the common property solution x̂, so the Nash solution becomes

xN = arg max
x

J
Y

[uj (x) − uj (x̂)] .

(6)

j=1

Area Weighted Average Utility (AWAU).

Another way to conceptualize the forma-

tion of groundwater management policy is by maximizing the weighted average utility of
the subregions of the aquifer. This emerges as the solution to at least two dierent political
economy models of local policy-making: probabilistic voting and lobbying of a central regulator.There is a substantial literature devoted to the outcome of democratic voting. Much
7
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of this work uses the median-voter model formulated by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957).
In the present setting, however, the policy space is multi-dimensionalthe level of water extraction in each subregionand in this context, the median voter model is not well-dened.
There will in general be no voter who is the median along all dimensions simultaneously. To
deal with multi-dimensional voting problems, Hinich (1977), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981),
and Ledyard (1981, 1984) introduce an alternate voting model referred to as probabilistic
voting. In this model, there is uncertainty regarding whether and how voters will cast their
ballots. When applied to our groundwater model, the solution to the probabilistic voting
model is the vector that solves

max
x

X

αi ui (x)

i

where i indexes voters and αi is a weight representing the probability that voter i will change
her vote based on changes in x. Voters who are highly responsive to changes in x have high
values of αi , while voters who are less responsive have low values of αi . This probabilistic
voting model therefore implies that the chosen policy will maximize a weighted average of
voter utility.
An alternate specication is that a central regulator is granted the power to set management policy. Individual interest groups will lobby the regulator to adopt a policy advantageous to their interests. Rausser et al., (2010) demonstrate that the solution to such a game
is the solution to

(

)

max U (x) +
x

X

βj uj (x)

(7)

j

where j indexes interest groups and βj is a coecient representing interest group j 's ability
to inuence the regulator. Groups that are able to improve the regulator's welfare at the
lowest cost to themselves have the highest values of βj .
The objective functions derived from the central regulator and local voting models are
formally indistinguishable; the only dierence is one of interpretation, the source of the
power weights. Moreover, if each voter or interest group had exactly the same weight, either

8
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model would produce the utilitarian social optimum as its equilibrium solution. In our
empirical analysis, we consider weights based on the relative size of subregions and thus
do not distinguish between the local voting and central regulator formulations. Area-based
weights are of particular interest in the agricultural regions of California because many water
districts there are explicitly governed by a one-acre, one-vote principle rather than a oneperson, one-vote principle. We will denote the solution to the area-based weighted average
objective function as xA .
We use the solutions to our two political models to determine the potential eectiveness
of local collective action. Specically, we compare the payo vectors U (xN ) and U (xA )
generated by these political models to the payo vectors under optimal management U (x∗ )
and under unrestricted common property, U (x̂). Due to non-negativity constraints, only
the common property model has a closed form solution; the other three solution vectors are
obtained by numerical methods. As a result, we cannot use analytical comparative statics
to determine the relative performance of our dierent political structures in varying aquifer
conditions. Instead, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation exercise in which we vary the
parameters describing the aquifer and its subregions. These simulations allow us to evaluate
the performance of these political structures under a broad variety of circumstances.

3

Monte Carlo Simulation

In this section, we explain how we use Monte Carlo simulations to analyze our model under a
variety of parameterizations. Each simulation run involves four steps: parameterizing the dynamic hydrological model, calibrating the static model to that parameterization, computing
our four solution concepts, and comparing the performance of each concept.
In the rst step, we take random draws from the parameter distributions that drive
our Monte Carlo simulations. We use

Matlab's pseudorandom number generator to draw

values for the hydrological parameters of a dynamic groundwater model with four subregions

9
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Table 1: Randomized Dynamic Model Parameters
Parameter
Subregion area (thousand acres)
Surface water available (acre feet/acre)
Surface water evaporation losses (%)
Water recharge per acre (acre feet/acre)
Current water demand (acre feet/acre)
Current groundwater depth (ft)
Demand elasticity
Subregion interaction (%)

Minimum

Maximum

250
0.0
0
0
0.5
30
-2
1

1250
3.0
30
0.04
3.0
300
-1
10

sharing a single groundwater aquifer. Each parameter is uniformly distributed on some
interval. These hydrological parameters and the intervals from which their values were
drawn are shown in Table 1. The values were chosen to be representative of conditions
within California's Central Valley.
In the second step, we calibrate the parameters αn , βn , φn , and γnm in Equations (1) and
(2) to the hydrological parameters drawn in the rst step. To do this , we conduct a second
Monte Carlo simulation, embedded within the rst. That is, we randomly draw values for
a vector y of subregional annual groundwater use levels. We then construct 50 year time
paths of groundwater benets and costs assuming subregion n extracts yn in each year. We
discount the resulting totals to present dollar values using a discount factor of 96%.3 Finally,
we use least-squares estimation to select the values of the parameters in Equations (1) and
(2) that best t our simulated data.
In the third step, we compute the values of x̂, x∗ , xN , and xA using numerical optimization techniques. In the last step, we compute the aggregate benets of groundwater use
associated with each of these solution vectors and compare the values.
In each simulation run, the labeling of subregions is arbitrary; all that matters is the
relationship between parameters across subregions. Table 2 presents summary statistics describing these relationships. The critical parameters are αn (demand intercept), βn (demand
3 The

choice of discount rate is somewhat subjective and varies in previous groundwater studies. Both 4%
(Brill and Burness, 1994; Burness and Brill, 2001; Knapp et al., 2003) and 5% (Kim et al., 1989; Provencher
and Burt, 1994; Knapp and Olson, 1995) are common choices. Our discount factor of 0.96 is comparable as
it implies a rate of 4.17%.

10
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slope), φn (cost coecient), and νn (interaction coecient). The interaction coecient is
equal to

νn =

X

γnm

m6=n

and is an aggregate measure of the degree to which a subregion inuences and is inuenced
by its neighbors. For each of these parameters, we compute for each iteration the mean,
maximum, minimum and spread across subregions.
Table 2 presents the distribution of values for these induced parameters across simulation
runs. In the results section below, the statistics listed in Table 2 are the explanatory variables
we use to explain the performance of the dierent political structures. In each case, the
relevant statistic in the left-hand column was computed across subregions within a given
iteration of the Monte Carlo simulations. The summary statistics listed in the columns to the
right were computed across simulations. For example, in the rst row we see that on average,
the mean (absolute value) demand slope was 1.52, but there was substantial variation. In
one iteration, the mean subregional demand slope was as low as 0.40 and in another, it was
as high as 5.58. The standard deviation across iterations of the mean subregional slope was
0.69. Moving down to the parameter minima section of the table, we see that on average,
the smallest subregional demand slope was 0.59, but that in one iteration, the subregion
with the smallest slope had a slope of 0.16 and in another iteration, the subregion with the
smallest demand slope had a slope as large as 2.03. Similar interpretations apply to the
remaining rows of the table.

4

Results

The impact of imposing optimal management is summarized in Table 3. We compute several measures to summarize the potential gain. First, we calculate the percentage gain in

11
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Table 2: Net Benet Function Parameter Draws: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics Across Iterations
Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Parameter Means
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area Share∗

1.52
2.20
0.75
0.34
0.25

0.69
0.35
0.26
0.11

0.40
1.27
0.27
0.09

5.58
3.37
2.23
0.82

Parameter Minima
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area Share

0.59
1.50
0.40
0.13
0.15

0.28
0.37
0.13
0.06
0.04

0.16
0.88
0.19
0.02
0.07

2.03
3.05
1.54
0.33
0.24

Parameter Maxima
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area Share

2.97
2937.55
1.25
0.58
0.36

1.88
477.86
0.60
0.26
0.05

0.53
1472.10
0.30
0.13
0.26

15.28
4002.80
5.56
2.03
0.5

1.09
647.14
0.39
0.20
0.09

0.88
238.62
0.27
0.12
0.03

0.05
36.41
0.02
0.01
0.01

6.80
1298.90
2.29
0.88
0.20

2.38
1.44
0.86
0.45
0.21

1.87
0.53
0.57
0.27
0.07

0.12
0.08
0.04
0.02
0.02

14.94
2.74
5.20
1.84
0.43

Parameter Standard Deviation
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area Share
Parameter Spread
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area Share
∗

Since there are four regions, the mean is always 0.25.

Table 3: Benet of Imposing Optimal Management
Summary Statistics Across Iterations
Variable
% Gain from Optimal Management
Mean Subregional % Gain
Minimum Subegional % Gain
Maximum Subegional % Gain
Std Dev of Subregional Gains
Spread of Subregional Gains

Mean Value
4.39
−3.46
−29.16
9.99
18.38
39.16

Standard Deviation
2.02
7.46
32.23
5.63
17.14
35.84

12

Minimum
0.68
−42.61
−100.00
1.17
0.49
1.07

Maximum
13.20
6.56
3.38
46.52
69.36
146.52
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aggregate benets from optimal management relative to the common property solution, i.e.,

U (x∗ ) − U (x̂)
× 100.
U (x̂)
On average, optimal management increases the aggregate benets of groundwater use by
approximately 4.39% relative to common property. There is substantial variation in the gains
across simulation iterations, ranging from virtually no gain to an increase of approximately
13.2%.These relatively small gains are consistent with the results observed by Gisser-Sanchez
and others, referenced in Section 1.
We then compute the percentage gains for each of the four subregions, i.e., for each n:

un (x∗ ) − un (x̂)
× 100.
un (x̂)
While the aggregate gain must be non-negative, individual subregions can and do experience
losses due to the move from common property to optimal management. All four regions
experience gains in only 4.3% of the iterations. Individual subregions may gain up to 46.5%
as a result of imposing optimal management, but other subregions may experience extremely
large losses. In some iterations, optimal management implies the complete cessation of
extraction in one or more subregions, i.e., those subregions lose 100% of their current benets
from groundwater use. These large losses mean that on average, the mean subregional
percentage is negative.4

4.1

Performance of Nash Bargaining

Politically, the subregional variation has very important consequences. The variation severely
limits the potential for a Nash bargaining game to capture large gains. Because the Nash
function is concave in the gain experienced by each subregion, it places some value on keeping
4 Note

the while the mean subregional gain measured in dollar values is simply the aggregate gain divided
by the number of regions and thus necessarily has the same sign as the aggregate gain, the mean percentage
gain can be negative even if the aggregate percentage gain is positive.
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Table 4: Performance of Nash Bargaining
Summary Statistics Across Iterations
Variable
% Gain from Nash Bargaining
% of Potential Gain Captured by Nash
% Gain Moving from Nash to Optimal

Mean Value

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

2.286
57.256
2.104

0.750
17.582
1.675

0.350
13.679
0.005

4.647
99.570
11.396

gains roughly equal across subregions. Moreover, since the Nash model is consensus based,
losses relative to common property cannot be imposed on one subregion in order to realize
larger gains in some other one.
The performance of the Nash model is summarized in Table 4. The rst row in Table
4 reports the percentage increase in the benets of groundwater use under Nash bargaining
compared with common property. The second row describes how well Nash bargaining
performs relative to an optimal management regime, listing the percentage of the potential
gains from management that are captured by Nash bargaining. The last row presents the
percentage gain moving from Nash bargaining to optimal management, i.e.

U (x∗ ) − U (xN )
× 100.
U (x̂)
The distribution across iterations of the performance of Nash bargaining is fairly narrow,
ranging from 0.35% gain to a 4.65% gain. While optimal management can generate gains
as large as 13.2%, Nash bargaining never generates gains higher than 4.65% of the common
property benets of groundwater use. On average, Nash bargaining results in a gain of only
2.29% relative to common property.
On average, Nash bargaining is able to capture only 57% of the gains captured by optimal
management. At the high end, Nash bargaining captures nearly all of the gains; at the low
end, it captures only 13.7%. Moreover, the correlation between the optimal management
gains and the fraction of those gains captured by a Nash bargaining process is -0.64. That
is, the higher the potential gains from management, the lower the fraction of those gains

14
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captured by bargaining. This result is driven by the strong positive correlation between the
size of optimal management gains and the maximum

losses

experienced by an individual

subregion. Large gains from optimal management are obtained by restricting pumping in
one or more subregions in order to improve the situation in others.. In a consensus-based
model such as Nash bargaining, the adversely aected subregion(s) would veto any such
redistribution.
We use response surface analysis to gain further insight into what drives the relative
performance of Nash bargaining. This methodology involves tting a response surface to the
results of the numerical simulation model. Mechanically, the process is similar to regression
analysis; we choose a functional form and estimate the values of the parameters that best t
our data.5 The dependent variable in our regressions is the percentage gain moving from Nash
bargaining to optimal management. The larger this value, the worse the performance of Nash
bargaining relative to optimal management. Explanatory variables include the parameter
calculations described in Section 3, summarized in Table 2, as well as the information about
the potential gains from optimal management and their distribution across subregions shown
in Table 3. We also include squared values of the descriptive statistics about the potential
gains from management to determine whether the impacts are nonlinear.
Because it is unclear whether the appropriate surface is linear in levels or logs, we rst
perform a Box-Cox transformation. The estimating equation is

X
yθ − 1
= β0 +
βi z i .
θ
i
Our point estimate for the value of θ is 0.7855 with a standard error of 0.0204; we thus reject
the null hypotheses that either a level or a log regression dependent variable is appropriate.
We report three separate response surfaces in Table 5. In the rst column, the dependent
variable is the level of the percentage gain moving from Nash bargaining to optimal man5 See

Kleijnen (1995), Kleijnen (1997), Kleijnen and Sargent (1997), Kleijnen (2001), Kleijnen et al. (2002),
and Kleijnen et al. (2005) for a discussion of the application of response surface analysis to the results of
simulation models.

15
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Table 5: Percentage Gain Moving from Nash Bargaining to Optimal Management
Percentage Gain

Log of % Gain

% Gain0.7885 −1

Potential % Gain
Aggregate
Mean
Minimum
Std Dev
Aggregate2
Mean2
Minimum2
Variance

0.622∗∗
−0.106∗∗
−0.023∗∗
−0.069∗∗
1.704∗∗
−0.161∗∗
−0.018∗∗
0.082∗∗

70.679∗∗
−3.437∗∗
−0.131
3.362†
−296.354∗∗
−5.616∗∗
−0.691
−4.621†

1.730∗∗
−0.230∗∗
−0.037∗∗
−0.089∗∗
−0.002
−0.378∗∗
−0.036∗∗
0.104∗

Parameter Means
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction

0.002∗∗
−0.001∗∗
0.000
−0.027∗∗

0.101
−0.081
−0.201
−1.987∗∗

0.004∗∗
−0.003∗∗
0.000
−0.061∗∗

Parameter Minima
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

0.000
0.001∗
−0.002
−0.025∗∗
−0.008∗

0.241∗∗
−0.012
−0.354
−1.370∗∗
0.218

0.002
0.002
−0.007
−0.058∗∗
−0.014

Parameter Spreads
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

−0.002∗∗
0.000∗∗
0.003∗
0.010∗∗
−0.015∗∗

−0.114∗
0.000∗∗
0.635∗∗
0.285
−0.465

−0.003∗∗
0.000∗∗
0.008∗
0.018∗∗
−0.028∗

Constant

0.002

−6.138∗∗

−1.263∗∗

N
R2
F

1000
0.983
2621.4

1000
0.896
382.1

1000
0.981
2301.5

∗∗

p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05,† p < 0.10
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agement. In the second, it is the natural log of this percentage gain. In the nal column,
the percentage gain is transformed by our point estimate for θ.
The response surfaces are able to explain between 90% and 98% of the variation in the
underlying data depending on the particular specication. These results provide additional
detail on how the size of aggregate gains inuences the performance of Nash bargaining:
we see that the linear eect of higher potential gains is positive and signicant in all three
specications. The quadratic eect is positive and signicant in the rst specication, negative and signicant in the second, and positive but insignicant in the third. This implies
that Nash bargaining performs poorly relative to optimal management, precisely when the
percentage gains from optimal management are large. Moreover, this impact is increasing
in the gains from optimal management.6 Both the linear and quadratic coecients on the
minimum subregional percentage gain are negative in all three specications and signicant
in the rst and third. This implies that Nash bargaining comes closer to replicating optimal management when the minimum percentage gain experienced by a subregion increases.
Nash bargaining will not impose losses on any region; when optimal management requires
imposing losses, Nash bargaining will diverge signicantly from optimal management. Increasing the minimum gain decreases the probability that a region must experience a loss
under optimal management.
Both coecients for mean gains are also negative and signicant in all specications.
Because we are comparing percentage gains, the mean tends to be lower when those who do
well under common property do even better under optimal management and vice versa. In
these situations, Nash bargaining will perform worse relative to optimal management. This
reects the tendency of Nash bargaining to balance gains across subregions.
In the rst and third specications, the coecients for the standard deviation of subregional percentage gain is negative and signicant while the coecient for the variance is
6 This

conclusion is consistent with the negative quadratic coecient in the second specication. The
dependent variable in the second regression is the natural log of the improved performance. The natural log
can increase at a decreasing rate while the level increases at an increasing rate.
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Table 6: Performance of Area-Based WAU
Summary Statistics Across Iterations
Variable
% Gain from AWAU
% of Potential Gain Captured by AWAU
% Gain Moving from AWAU to Optimal

Mean Value

Standard Deviation

2.172
43.762
2.218

3.066
66.027
2.637

Minimum
−21.151
−342.120
0.000

Maximum
13.031
99.998
31.267

positive and signicant. Given the coecients themselves and the range of values for the
standard deviation of percentage gains, these estimates imply that increasing the variation in
subregional percentage gain under optimal management improves the performance of Nash
bargaining relative to optimal management, albeit at a decreasing rate. While this may
seem surprising a priori, it is a reection of the other controls in the regression. The pairwise
correlation between the percentage gain moving from Nash to optimal and the variation
in percentage gains under optimal management is positive, implying that, as we would expect, Nash bargaining performs worse when optimal management requires large variation in
regional gains.
Finally, increasing the average degree of interaction between subregions increases the
performance of Nash bargaining, but increasing the spread of interaction across subregions
decreases performance. That is,all else equal, the more interconnected are the subregions,
the greater is the congruence between their interests, and Nash bargaining will do a better
job of capturing potential gains. However, as variation in the degree of interconnection
across subregions increases, subregional interests will diverge, making it more dicult to
simultaneously balance gains across subregions and achieve large aggregate gains.

4.2

Performance of the AWAU model

There is substantial divergence between the performance of the Nash bargaining game and
that of the AWAU model. Results for the latter are summarized in Table 6. On average,
the AWAU model results in gains of only 2.17% relative to common property, less than the
average gain of 2.29% for Nash bargaining. However, the distribution of gains is much larger
18
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than for Nash bargaining. The AWAU model can result in a net loss of up to 21% relative
to common property. However, it could also result in a net gain of over 13%. The AWAU
model can be almost as eective as optimal management. This result is not surprising; if all
the subregions are equal in size, the AWAU model will replicate the utilitarian social welfare
maximizing solution. But since the AWAU model can result in losses, it is clear that the
political structures that it represents can also perform far worse than optimal management.
The key question is:

when

does the AWAU model perform well? Table 7 reports coe-

cients for a response surface explaining the increase in percentage gains relative to common
property, moving from AWAU to optimal management. As this number increases, the performance of AWAU relative to common property declines. As before, we rst consider a
Box-Cox transformation. Our point estimate for θ is 0.2444 with a standard deviation of
0.0141, once again suggesting that neither the level or the log is the appropriate variable.
We report all three surfaces as before.
All three surfaces perform less well than those estimated for Nash bargaining, explaining
between 60% and 76% of the variation in outcomes. Notably, the performance of the AWAU
model exhibits a dierent pattern from Nash bargaining with respect to aggregate gains.
While the linear coecient on aggregate gains is similarly positive, the quadratic coecient
is negative. This implies that like Nash bargaining, the relative performance of AWAU falls
as the percentage gains increase. However, while this eect is magnied at the largest values
under Nash bargaining, it is attenuated at the largest values under AWAU.There is a positive
relationship between the smallest element of the weighting vector and the fraction of gains
captured. This is logical as the AWAU approaches the social welfare maximizing policy as
the weights get closer, i.e. as the minimum weight approaches 0.25. Increasing the standard
deviation of weights has a negative impact on the performance of AWAU. Again, this is
expected as a standard deviation of zero would reproduce optimal management. Increasing
the average interaction between regions still increases the performance, just as increasing
the standard deviation of that interaction decreases the performance.
19
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Table 7: Percentage Gain Moving from AWAU to Optimal Management
Percentage Gain

Log % Gain

% Gain0.2444 −1

Potential % Gain
Aggregate
Mean
Minimum
Std Dev
Aggregate2
Mean2
Minimum2
Variance

0.907∗∗
0.227∗∗
0.054
0.111
−3.799∗
0.236∗
0.094∗∗
−0.333∗∗

59.696∗∗
6.072∗∗
−0.752
−0.096
−201.862∗∗
3.746
3.640∗∗
−20.725∗∗

22.678∗∗
2.529∗∗
−0.077
−0.160
−94.143∗∗
2.697†
1.136∗∗
−5.432∗∗

Parameter Means
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction

0.002
0.007†
−0.040∗
−0.142∗∗

0.232
0.209
−1.283†
−6.816∗∗

0.085
0.099∗
−0.487∗
−2.312∗∗

Parameter Minima
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

−0.004
−0.009∗
0.036∗
0.082∗∗
0.020

−0.012
−0.317†
0.778
3.591∗∗
−4.986∗∗

−0.013
−0.134∗∗
0.266
0.963∗∗
−1.377∗∗

Parameter Spreads
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

−0.004
0.000
0.033∗∗
0.144∗∗
0.499∗∗

0.071
0.000
0.249
5.333∗∗
26.595∗∗

−0.020
0.000
0.239
1.812∗∗
8.627∗∗

Constant

−0.039∗∗

−6.917∗∗

−3.490∗∗

998
0.701
103.970

998
0.756
137.007

N
R2
F
∗∗

998
0.600
66.377
p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05,† p < 0.10
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Figure 1: Distribution of Political Structure Performance (Aggregate)
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Second Best Political Structure

The results in the previous two subsections suggest that Nash bargaining and the AWAU
model perform quite dierently in certain situations. Figure 1 compares the distribution of
percentage gains across iterations for the three models. As noted previously, Nash bargaining
has the tightest distribution and AWAU utility has the widest.
By denition, optimal management produces the largest possible aggregate gains. Figure
2 compares the distributions of the fractions of these potential gains that are captured by
Nash bargaining and AWAU. While AWAU is able to capture some of the largest potential
gains, Nash bargaining cannot.
In this section, we examine the circumstances under which one of the models performs
better than the other, i.e. when U (xN ) > U (xA ) or vice versa. Since optimal management
Figure 2: Fraction of Gains Captured

Frequency

Area Weights

Frequency

Nash Bargaining

−300 −200 −100
0
% of Potential Gains

100

−300 −200 −100
0
% of Potential Gains

21

100

The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000010

Table 8: Aggregate Political Structure Preference
Logit Coecient

∆Pˆr Max - Min

Marginal Eect

Potential Gain
Aggregate
Minimum
Std Dev
Aggregate2
Minimum2
Variance

−3.919∗∗
4.213∗∗
2.658
0.538∗∗
0.148
−0.644

−0.989
0.930
0.930
0.904
0.381
−0.477

−0.879∗∗
0.945∗∗
0.596
0.121∗∗
0.033
−0.144

Parameter Means
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction

−0.025
3.390∗∗
−2.594
−2.002

−0.029
0.943
−0.630
−0.293

−0.006
0.760∗∗
−0.582
−0.449

Parameter Minima
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

−2.506∗∗
0.626
−1.505
5.245
−47.428∗∗

−0.590
0.318
−0.328
0.366
−0.940

−0.562∗∗
0.141
−0.338
1.176
−10.636∗∗

Parameter Spreads
Slope
Intercept
Cost
Interaction
Area

1.868∗∗
−0.003∗∗
−6.638∗
−0.264
69.205∗∗

0.913
−0.593
−0.817
−0.044
0.993

0.419∗∗
−0.001∗∗
−1.489∗
−0.059
15.520∗∗

0.000

0.000∗∗

Constant

3.492†

N
Pseudo R2

1000
0.554

∗∗

p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05,† p < 0.10

performs the best in the aggregate by denition, these calculations determine whether Nash
bargaining or the AWAU model is the second-best structure. Table 8 reports a logit response
surface for the likelihood that Nash bargaining dominates. Specically, we dene a dummy
variable equal to 1 if Nash bargaining outperforms the AWAU model on an aggregate basis
and equal to 0 if the AWAU model dominates and use this as the dependent variable in
the logit regression. The left column of the table reports the logit coecients and their
signicance. The center column gives the change in the predicted probability that Nash
bargaining outperforms AWAU induced by moving the given variable from its minimum
value to its maximum value, holding all other independent variables xed at their means.
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Finally, the right column of the table reports the marginal eect of increasing the given
independent variable from its mean. Again, all other variables are held xed at their means.
In this regression, the explanatory variables are the dollar value of optimal management
gains rather than percentage increases over common property values.
Overall, Nash bargaining dominates in approximately 44.7% of the iterations. The logit
estimates indicate that the AWAU model is far more likely to dominate when the minimum
area weight is larger and when the spread in area weights is smaller. This result is expected
since these conditions indicate that the area weights are close to equal and therefore that
the the AWAU model more closely approximates optimal management.
Of more interest is the fact that the coecient on aggregate gains to optimal management
is negative, implying that the Nash model is less likely to dominate when the percentage
gain to optimal management is large. In other words, regions with the most to gain from
managing groundwater would be better o if water management policy were to emerge from
the kinds of political structures represented by the AWAU model than by the consensusbased structures represented by Nash bargaining. These results suggest that an outside
entity seeking to determine which political structure would best serve the aggregate interests
of stakeholders in a particular region would need to investigate the particular situation quite
closely to ensure selection of the appropriate structure. In other words, it would be unwise to
encourage or foster either of the two structures we examine in all situations. Nash bargaining
limits the extent to which some subregions can gain advantages at the expense of others,
but it inhibits the exploitation of large potential gains, while AWAU does the reverse. This
result lends support to the Blomquist (1992) argument for exibility in local management
of aquifers. While Blomquist advocated exibility in the choice of mechanisms by which
groundwater is managed, our results have implications for the political processes from which
these mechanisms emerge. Specically, our comparison of the Nash and AWAU models
suggest that exibility in the design of the institutions for aquifer management may be
required in order to match political structures to dierent local conditions.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Subregional Gains
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4.4

Subregional Political Structure Preference.

In the previous subsection, we compared political structures from an aquifer-level perspective.
However, it is extremely unlikely that all subregions within an aquifer will agree about the
choice of political structure, especially when these subregions have diverse characteristics.
As an obvious example, larger subregions will prefer political structures in which size is an
important determinant of political power, while smaller ones will likely prefer structures in
which each subregion has more or less equal political power.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of subregional gains across iterations for the dierent
political economy models. Once again, the distribution for Nash bargaining is much tighter,
due to a combination of preventing any region from experiencing losses and its preference
for distributing gains equally. Both optimal management and AWAU have signicant spikes
at 100% losses, although the spike is much larger for AWAU than for optimal management.
Table 9 investigates the distribution of subregional preferences over the dierent political
structures. For each parameter draw, we count the number of subregions that do better
under either Nash, AWAU or optimal management. Table 9 summarizes this data in a block
diagonal matrix: for i = 0, . . . , 4 and j = 0, ..., 4 − i, the i, j 'th entry in the matrix is the
frequency with which i subregions do best under WAU, j subregions do best under Nash and
the remainder do best under optimal management. In no case do all four subregions do best
under the same political structure. The single most common conguration of preferences
24
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Table 9: Subregional Preferences for Political Structure
# That Prefer Nash
# That Prefer AWAU

Zero

One

Two

Three

Four

Zero
One
Two
Three
Four

0
0
7
6
0

3
55
214
201

7
97
384

0
26

0

is that the two larger subregions do best under WAU while the two smaller subregions do
best under Nash bargaining. On average, just under two of the four subregions do better
under WAU than either Nash bargaining or optimal management. Optimal management is
rarely preferred. The lowest diagonal (i.e., the one with ve elements) represents the ve
possible combinations in which no subregion prefers optimal management. Only three of the
ve elements have nonzero entries, but these cases account for 61% of the total observations.
Thus in only 39% of the cases does some subregion prefer optimal management. More than
one subregion prefers optimal management in only 7% of the cases.

5

Conclusions

The results reported here conrm that intra-aquifer heterogeneity has important political
consequences. The Nash bargaining model used to study local collective action formalizes
the conclusions oered by Ostrom (1990). In particular, the analysis in this chapter conrms
that local collective action is far more likely to be successful when subregions are relatively
homogeneous.It also highlights the importance of heterogeneity as an impediment to successful collective action and so raises serious concerns about the ability of local political
structures to mitigate groundwater problems on their own.
Our results for the Nash bargaining model suggest that on average local consensusbased political structures might capture a little more than half of the potential gains from
collective action. Our results also suggests, however, that such structures will perform least
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well precisely when there is the most to gain. This result lends credence to suggestions
that the State of California may need to intervene to promote better management. It also
suggests that the benets intervention are likely to vary across subregions.
Our analysis of the AWAU model suggests that under some circumstances, political structures based on either voting or lobbying may perform better than consensus-based bargaining. One institutional change that would move in this direction would be to assign to existing
water agencies the authority and obligation to develop water management plans. However,
this approach should be pursued with caution as such regimes also have the potential to decrease welfare from current levels. Finally, intra-aquifer disparity in the preferences of local
stakeholders over political structures implies that reaching agreement on future groundwater
decision-making authority will be challenging.
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